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Narrative Understanding and Understanding Narrative
  Sarah E. Worth
Abstract
In this paper I deal with the question of how it is that we have
emotional responses to things that we do not believe in the
reality of, specifically things like characters and events in
literature and film (the paradox of fiction). The direction in
which I wish to take this query is not the traditional
philosophical approach to this question, however. There has
been much written on this particular approach, and because of
this I think that it is becoming, in philosophical effect, stuck.
What I wish to do in what follows is to approach this question
from a different set of assumptions and from a different
paradigm, with the hope that I will be able to produce a more
constructive and perhaps even more accurate resolution to the
problem.
Key Words
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The more isolated I become, the more I come to
like stories.
-----Aristotle, Fragment 688
To say that all human thinking is essentially of
two kinds-reasoning on the one hand, and
narrative, descriptive, contemplative thinking on
the other-is to say only what every reader's
experience will corroborate.
-----William James
Philosophers often concern themselves with questions that
seem either overly convoluted or downright obvious to
laypeople. The question that I have concerned myself with for
the past several years, that seems all too obvious to those
around me, is this: "How is it that we have emotional
responses to things that we do not believe in the reality of,
specifically things like characters and events in literature and
film?" The direction in which I wish to take this query is not the
traditional philosophical approach to this question. There has
been much written on this particular approach, and because of
this I think that it is becoming, in philosophical effect, stuck.
What I wish to do in what follows is to approach this question
from a different set of assumptions and from a different
paradigm, with the hope that I will be able to produce a more
constructive and perhaps even more accurate resolution to the
problem. I also hope that by using a different framework that I
put forward, the kinds of discussions philosophers have about
this problem might change as well.
The roots of the issue I will here discuss have their basis in
Plato and Aristotle's discussions of the kinds of emotions that
representations (or falsities) produce in us and whether such
emotions are healthy. One recent form of this debate appears
in what I will call the classical construction of the paradox of
fiction. This is a paradox constructed to question how it is that
we can have seemingly real emotional responses to the
situations of fictional characters, when, under normal
circumstances, we have to believe in the reality of the states of
affairs described by propositions that describe certain
situations in order to have emotional responses to them. It is
clear that we do not believe the propositional statements that
describe fictional situations and so it seems odd, or at least
philosophically inconsistent, that we should respond in the
same way that we do when we do believe the propositional
statements.
What I wish to do here is to call into question the construction
of the paradox itself by changing the nature of the question
that prompts the paradox. I will focus the discussion on how it
is that we cognitively order, construct meaning in, and
understand the world around us. I will borrow from literary
theory, narratology and cognitive psychology for different kinds
of explanations of how we order our experience of the world
and how we understand fiction. In the end I will argue how
these two ways of ordering experience (of experiences with
real intentional objects and those with fictional intentional
objects) are more in line with one another than the paradox of
fiction assumes. For the purposes of this paper I will look
exclusively at the narrative descriptions that produce the
seemingly odd, or philosophically unjustified, emotional
responses and ignore for the time being the visual arts
altogether. What I hope to show in the end is that by appealing
to a different model on which to base the way that we order
and understand our experience of the world, our emotional
responses to fiction will not seem as odd to philosophers, and
might appear as natural (and even as justified) as they do to
the laypeople with whom we interact.
1. The paradox of fiction and its assumptions
The classical construction of the paradox of fiction is as follows:
1. We have emotions concerning the situations of fictional
characters.
2. To have an emotion concerning someone's situation we
must believe the propositions that describe that situation.
3. We do not believe the propositions that describe the
situations of fictional characters.
Attempted resolutions to the paradox usually attack one of the
three propositions. Pretense theorists deny the first
proposition, suggesting that the emotions that we have with
fictional characters as their intentional objects are not genuine
but "quasi"-emotional responses,[1] "as-if" emotions [2] or
some other alternate variation denying the same quality or
kind of emotional responses that we have to real characters.[3]
Those who deny the second proposition, generally known as
thought theorists, advocate different views about what is
required in terms of cognitive content in order to have an
emotional response. They argue that we can have justified
emotions as a result of propositional beliefs merely entertained
but not believed.[4] Thought theorists argue that there is not a
strict existential belief requirement necessary about
propositions in order to have a justified emotive response.
Those who argue against the third proposition of the paradox
of fiction are known generally as illusion theorists and they
argue for a stronger variation of the proposition, which defends
the readers' cognitive states. That is, they argue that we do, in
some sense, believe the propositions that describe the
situations of the fictional characters.[5]
I want to suggest that there are two implicit assumptions
working within this paradox that will continually constrain the
kinds of possible resolutions available and will never allow the
paradox to be resolved. First, as the paradox is constructed,
the belief component is assumed to be a necessary part of a
genuine emotive response.[6] A reader must either believe the
propositions that describe that situation or she must disbelieve
the propositions. Or, for the thought theorists, the reader must
at least seriously entertain the propositional statements. If
there is no belief in the reality of the situation, that anyone
was really affected or that anyone really experienced what
happened in the fiction, then there is no belief, existentially, in
its reality. If I were told that the information about to be
imparted to me is false, and I am then informed that I won the
lottery, it would indeed be odd for me to become ecstatic,
mildly excited or affected at all-and I certainly would not begin
to behave as if I had won the lottery by running up my credit
card bills. If I do not believe the propositions that describe a
given situation, it would, indeed, seem odd that I would
behave or respond emotionally as though I did believe them.
This very fact, that I respond emotionally (cry, feel fear, clench
my fists etc.) to things I do not believe to exist or to be really
happening is at the heart of the phenomenon that generates
the paradox of fiction in the first place.
What further prompts the primacy of the role of the belief
requirement in a justified emotive response is that until
recently the prevailing theory of emotions did, in fact, depend
on beliefs to locate the cause of the emotive response. The
cognitive theory of emotions is based on a general model that
claims that emotions are cognitively constructed by the beliefs
and judgments that might prompt them. Recently, however,
philosophers like Jenefer Robinson[7] and Paul Griffiths[8]
have suggested a different model of emotions that does not
depend on the cognitive prompts that other judgmentalist
theories have previously held to be necessary.[9] Robinson, for
example, argues that the startle response is evidence that
emotions (including primitive ones like the startle response
itself) are at least partly physiologically, and not cognitively,
based. Robinson argues that the evidence from
neurophysiology shows that emotions do not depend upon
cognitive judgments. She explains, "the formulations of beliefs,
judgments, and conceptions about a situation are not
necessary to an emotional response."[10] Further, the
cognitive belief components are neither necessary nor
sufficient for an emotive response. Given the predominance of
the judgmentalist or cognitive view of emotions, an emphasis
on a belief seems warranted. Considering, however, that there
are other viable theories that do not require the cognitive
components once thought necessary, it seems only fair to call
this into question.
The second assumption I wish to call into question is that we
can clearly differentiate between what is fictional and what is
real and that we always have knowledge of the propositions
that describe a set of circumstances as being one or the other.
The paradox assumes not only that we can distinguish between
the fictional and the real, but it implies that they are indeed
two completely different things altogether, both ontologically
and epistemically. I will not argue the ontological distinction
here, but I do want to call into question the notion that
epistemically there is a clear distinction between the real and
the fictional and that it is possible or even likely that we can
identify that distinction. Although there may be two completely
differentiable realms of fiction and reality, practically, we do
not always have full information on which to base a distinction.
Further, epistemically, having full information may not be what
is really relevant in terms of understanding or differentiating
between the real and the fictional. I will address this concern
more fully later.
For the purposes of my argument, I wish to bracket these two
assumptions: that a cognitive belief requirement is necessary
for a justified emotive response and that fiction and reality are
always distinguishable. I will deal with both of these later in
the paper, but for now, I want to change the direction of my
query. Rather than explaining why the paradox is unresolvable
or why each of the different kinds of responses fails to resolve
it, what I propose to do in what follows is to change the
question from, "How is it that we can have emotional
responses to fictional intentional objects?" to "Is there
something about narrative that is different from other linguistic
constructions and that makes us tend to respond emotionally?"
With a different construction of the problem, I will more easily
be able to formulate a different resolution that better reflects
the way that we experience the world and is more reflective of
how we order and understand the world, and makes our
emotive responses to fiction seem reasonable.
2. A new paradigm: the narrative and the discursive
To begin to construct a new paradigm from which to approach
the question "Is there something about narrative in particular,
different from other linguistic constructions, that makes us
tend to respond emotionally?" I first want to turn the
discussion to storytelling. The way we tell stories, how we
understand the stories that others tell us, the way we use
stories to recall memory, and the role that storytelling and
story-creation play in developing a theory of personal identity
are all integral to the way we order and make sense of our
experience in the world. The kinds of stories I am referring to
are the most basic-the stories we relate to other people in our
lives describing our experience of the world. We create stories
out of the most mundane information to the most exciting,
inspirational things that we experience. I will, from now on,
refer to these kinds of everyday general retellings as stories or
as being in story-form.
I wish to begin to build a new framework within which I can
address the question of why we respond to fictions by making
an argument that there are (at least) two fundamentally
different ways that we order our experience of the world-the
discursive[11] and the narrative. Most generally, the discursive
mode relies on logical, linear reasoning while the narrative
depends on the narrative aspects of a situation to show how
one state of affairs is motivated by a previous one (although
not necessarily caused by it). Each of these two ways of
knowing and ordering the world, the narrative and the
discursive, has different operating principles and each has its
own criteria for success. They differ fundamentally in the ways
they go about verification. Narrative psychologist Jerome
Bruner goes so far as to assert that "a good story and a well-
formed argument are different natural kinds"[12] even though
both are used as ways of communicating information and of
convincing others. He explains that the discursive "verifies by
eventual appeal to procedures for establishing formal and
empirical truth" while the narrative "establishes not truth but
verisimilitude"[13] and lifelikeness. We utilize both the
narrative and the discursive to order our experience. Both are
legitimate ways of understanding our experience of the world,
but both are also produced cognitively by different means.
Although these two modes of understanding are
complementary, it is important to note that they are neither
reducible nor translatable to one another. It seems unlikely,
and worse, futile, to attempt to either reduce or translate from
one to the other since they are, at base, fundamentally
different kinds of reasoning and ordering. This is not to say,
moreover, that stories cannot exemplify both the narrative and
the discursive. Many Sherlock Holmes mysteries, for example,
are presented in the form of a narrative, but what motivates
the reader in this case is not the narrative aspects of the novel
as much as the discursive clues that one has to follow to figure
out the mystery. Edgar Allan Poe demonstrated this also in the
introduction to "The Murders in the Rue Morgue." Poe made
clear early in the story that straightforward logical reasoning
will not always be the best strategy for figuring out a mystery
(in this case). Poe noted that "the analytical power should not
be confounded with simple ingenuity; for while the analyst is
necessarily ingenious, the ingenious man is often remarkably
incapable of analysis."[14] The story that follows shows how
listening for the narrative clues will bring one to a fuller
understanding of the story than strict logical reasoning. He
says that "the difference in the extent of the information
obtained, lies not so much in the validity of the inference as in
the quality of the observation."[15] Further, even though both
the narrative and the discursive can exist in a single text does
not mean they cannot be differentiated.
The logical proof, "Socrates is a man, all men are mortal,
therefore Socrates is mortal," is an example of discursive
reasoning. The logical and causal steps along the way are
apparent, linear and straightforward. No one who understands
even the folkways of logic could deny that the conclusion
follows the premises, categorically. This is a completely
different kind of reasoning than is expressed in the kind of
motivation which prompts Creon to make a decision about
whether or not he should let Antigone give her brother a
proper burial. Although there are identifiable discursive
components to Creon's reasoning, these are not what motivate
the story, nor are they the elements that help readers to
empathize with Antigone.
The kinds of causation used in the two different cases, of
Socrates being proved mortal and Creon being forced to make
difficult kingly decisions, are patently different. Further, the
linking term then has two different functions in the two cases.
For example, in the logical proposition "If x, then y" and in the
narrative recit "The queen died and then the king died, of
grief"[16] then functions as a logical consequence in the
former and as an explanation for mortal grief in the latter. The
former looks for universal truth conditions and the latter looks
for human connections and general explanations between
events. The goal of causation in the two cases is construed
differently, even though it exists in both ways of knowing; the
goals are different for the two ways of knowing, and the
cognitive processes that aim at these goals are fundamentally
different as well.
The discursive mode uses general causes and employs them in
order to be able to test empirical truth and to find universal
truth conditions. Bruner explains that the discursive mode
"leads to good theory, tight analysis, logical proof, sound
argument, and empirical discovery guided by reasoned
hypothesis."[17] Further, he explains that the discursive mode
"attempts to fulfill the ideal of a formal, mathematical system
of description and explanation" and in order to do that, "it
employs categorization or conceptualization and the operations
by which categories are established, instantiated, idealized,
and related to one another to form a system."[18] The
discursive mode allows us to see logical connections between
states of affairs prior to being able to prove them empirically.
It further allows us the faculty of abstract reasoning, which can
go above and beyond the particular example of any given
situation. This ability to abstract is essential to our functioning
as humans but it is not what makes it reasonable to respond
emotionally to particular situations we believe to be fictional.
For that, we must rely on the narrative mode, and our interest
in relating to others through stories in general. The narrative
mode, in opposition to the discursive, will lead to good stories,
and believable dramatic and historical accounts. The narrative
mode looks primarily for human (and not necessarily or
exclusively logical) connections between characters and
events.
The discursive mode of reasoning, by and large, underlies
philosophers' attempts to resolve the paradox of fiction. The
logical construction of the paradox assumes that the discursive
mode of thinking is the only mode available for use. The way
that the three premises of the paradox add up entails the
logical nature of the causal and linear way of thinking that is
epitomized by the discursive mode. I want to argue that, seen
in light of the narrative mode of understanding and reasoning,
the question of why we have emotional responses to fictional
intentional objects (assuming that we do not respond to things
we do not believe in the reality of), the classical construction of
the paradox of fiction is misguided in and of itself,
philosophically misleading, and most importantly, inherently
unresolvable. If it really is a goal of philosophers to come up
with a workable and reasonable resolution to the seemingly
odd emotional responses we have to fiction, we have to change
the nature of the question. I wish to rely on the model of the
narrative way of ordering experience in order to show how this
can be used as a different context from which to look at the
original question that prompts the paradox of fiction.
It is clear that if a reader were asked while reading a novel
whether or not she had an existential belief about the
characters in the novel, the answer would likely be "No" (she
does not believe the characters really exist). This is not,
however, what is at the core of the issue. What is at issue is
the fact that, although we know the existential, propositional
statements are false (readers know that the proposition
"Cinderella exists"[19] is false), we also have knowledge of
events within the fiction that does not correspond to the same
framework of discursive propositional statements. "Cinderella
went to the ball" is an example of a proposition that we believe
to be true in the fiction.[20] Rather than separating what is
true in the fiction from what is true in reality or outside the
fiction I suggest that we continue to bracket that dividing line
between fiction and reality and distinguish these by the
discursive and the narrative forms of reasoning. That is, there
are existential, logical, questions we have about Cinderella, but
also narrative questions that can be understood only within the
narrative mode. If the existential disbelief of the propositional
statements were all that is at stake and the narrative really
were reducible to the discursive, then the classical construction
of the paradox really would be the definitive end of the debate.
I want to argue, however, that the narrative really is a
fundamentally different kind of meaning construction and
entails a different kind of understanding and processing of
information. The narrative mode of understanding is what
remains constant between the stories we hear and tell about
"real" events and the stories we know to be fictional.
3. Narrative
Although it is not necessary for me to defend a particular
theory of narrative, it will be useful to outline some of the
features that are most commonly included in theories of
narrative. Generally, narratives involve at least two events or
states of affairs, which are in some way ostensively connected.
The events usually concern the interests of at least one unified
subject and there must be some sort of narrator. The temporal
relations between the events are perspicuously ordered. Most
times the events are sequenced in such a way that causal
connections can be delineated. That is, earlier events in the
narrative can be shown to be causally relevant to the
effect.[21] There is some implied causal link between events,
which shows their connection beyond an episodic or chronicled
catalogue of happenings. A narrative explanation of a series of
events is focused on how change from beginning to end is
produced and not just on how one event is predicted or
deduced from another.
An annal represents historical reality, listed chronologically, as
if the real events did not take the form of a story. A chronicle,
on the other hand, represents in such a way that lists of events
appear in the form of unfinished stories. "The queen died and
then the king died" is a chronicle, but not a narrative. "The
queen died and then the king died of grief" is a narrative,
partly because it utilizes causation or consequence, but mostly
because it shows a relationship in the story, which goes beyond
a timeline and into the relationship between the characters.
Narratives also require more of the listener if she is to
understand how all of the parts come together to form a
coherent whole.
For my purposes what qualifies as a narrative is less important
than the ways in which and the frequency of which we process
what comes to us in story-form. Roland Barthes explains the
pervasiveness of narratives in our lives as follows:
"The narrative may incorporate articulate language, spoken or
written; pictures, still or moving; gestures and the ordered
arrangement of all the ingredients: it is present in myth,
legend, fable, short story, epic, history, tragedy, comedy,
pantomime, painting, stained glass windows, cinema, comic
strips, journalism, conversation. In addition, under this almost
infinite number of forms, the narrative is present at all times,
in all places, in all societies; the history of narrative begins
with the history of mankind; there does not exist, and never
has existed, a people without narratives."[22]
Narrative is also a concept that is used in a variety of ways.
Narrative can be used to describe a kind or quality of a text
(with text defined loosely as well). It can also be used to
describe how we interpret a particular text. Further, what I call
narrative understanding is the mental mechanism with which
we understand previously constructed narratives, how we order
and make meaning out of unordered information we take in
from the world, and how we employ narration to express our
views and experiences to others through stories.
4. Understanding stories
I want to argue that we make sense of our experiences of the
world primarily in terms of stories. This is not to say that we do
not remember, order, or make sense of outside data in any
other ways. This is also not to say that external information
comes to us in the form of stories; it is clear that whatever
information that might be obtained by any given sequence of
events arrives and is available for the makings of a story still
needs to be crafted into a story. What I do want to argue is
that the primary way that humans make sense of, and order
their experiences in the world, is through the act of creating,
telling and understanding stories. Barbara Hardy argues that
storytelling plays a major role in both our sleeping and waking
lives. She says, "we dream in narrative, daydream in narrative,
remember, anticipate, hope, despair, believe, doubt, plan,
revise, criticize, construct, gossip, learn, hate and love by
narrative."[23] Self-expression is done primarily through
narrative construction and communication. Understanding of a
significant part of the world is also made comprehensible
through the stories we tell to others (and the ones we tell
ourselves) and the stories others tell us.
In his work on artificial intelligence, Roger Schank goes so far
as to assert that "storytelling and understanding are
functionally the same thing"[24] and that "intelligence is bound
up with our ability to tell the right story at the right time."[25]
The ability to remember the gist of a story, to index and
reference a multitude of stories, and to be able to express
them well is an extremely important and useful aspect of
intelligence.[26]
We experience the world and craft stories based on that
experience in order to make sense of it. Fictional narratives
(good ones, or well-told ones), then, take only what is
significant in an event and present that, without the
unstructured events that we experience in our own lives.
Understanding fictional narratives and understanding
narratives about "real" events thus employ the same cognitive
process. What is significant here is that we understand
narratives in a consistent way and not that we understand or
process narrative accounts of real and fictional stories primarily
in terms of whether or not we believe the propositional
statements that are descriptive of the narrative. Belief is
secondary, at best, to the unified cognitive processes of what it
takes to understand a narrative. The way we experience
fiction, then, is based in the same cognitive processes as the
way we respond to the stories we hear from others. The kind
and degree of emotional response we have to fictional
narratives and the narratives other people tell us will have to
do more with the subject matter and the story construction
than it has to do with whether we believe or disbelieve the
propositions that constitute the story.
Schank argues that one of the primary ways that we make
sense of our world is through storytelling. He suggests that
when someone experiences something in the world, she has a
set of scripts that she uses as general reference points. For
example, I have a restaurant script that allows me to go to a
restaurant and have a certain, reasonable set of expectations
of how this event is going to go, and what the expectations are
of me if I want to be served food. We have these general
scripts for all kinds of activities in our lives, everything from
brushing our teeth to going to the grocery store to engaging in
romantic relationships. If we did not have these scripts, then
every situation would be new every time, and we would
constantly be bombarded with new information that is
unstructured by habit, social mores, and practical knowledge.
Scripts are used like a set of expectations about how certain
familiar situations will play out. Schank explains "in a sense,
many situations in life have the people who participate in them
seemingly reading their roles in a kind of play."[27] We have
life scripts that we play out, but we also have scripts for almost
everything else we do while interacting with others as well as
while we function alone. The scripts through which we
experience the world are relatively easily adaptable to certain
new information and new variables that might be introduced.
Life can be somewhat frustrating for those who cannot or
choose not to be flexible with these scripts.[28]
When we create a catalogue of stories, we also construct an
indexing and referencing system. When I experience an event
in the world, the data that I can take in about that event is not
organized in any meaningful way. When I relate to someone
else my experience of the event, I use the aspects that I
consider to be relevant to my expressing the gist of what
happens. I can choose to tell about my experience in a number
of ways using a number of different aspects of what happened,
and the aspects I choose to create a story out of might be very
different from the ones someone else might choose. But a
story is a much better way of communicating the gist of an
event because stories illustrate events in a more effective and
efficient way than just simply relating a chronology of things
that happened or listing a set of beliefs or attitudes. If my
story is good enough, I will not have to state the point of the
story at all, and my beliefs will be made apparent along the
way as well.
Not only are stories the most effective means of
communicating with others, but stories also help us to form
memories of particular events in our lives. One way that we
organize all of the incoming information is into what Schank
calls Memory Organization Packages (MOPs). He explains that
a MOP covers a context dependent aspect of memory.
Memories are partially based on scripts, but as we recall events
later, we remember how the event perhaps varied from a
script, or we remember how a particular event happened within
a particular context. He suggests examples of MOPs as things
like going on a family vacation or on a first date. Any MOP is
made up of a set of scenes that are imaginable and easily
recalled within the framework of the MOP. Schank suggests
that "in this view of memory, episodes that occur get stored in
terms of the scene in which they took place and can be
connected to the larger context by reconstruction."[29] In this
way, then, we take in unorganized information and, through
the process of creating stories, we both communicate to others
as well as help to solidify the experience for ourselves. Much of
our knowledge is then comprised of the set of experiences we
have had in the world, and it becomes established through the
stories we tell of our experiences. We also remember our
experiences through stories, as we often find that one person's
story will help us to recall an aspect of one of our own stories.
Most people index and recall through stories rather than
propositional beliefs or attitudes because they are easier to
remember and to index. Our communication with others,
however, is limited to the stories that we have to tell. On our
own we have a storehouse of memories and experiences, but
what we communicate to others are often stories. Thus,
knowledge is experiences and stories; intelligence is the ability
to tell an appropriate story containing the appropriate
information and emotional pull, at an appropriate time, crafting
just the right story from a storehouse of options, for the right
occasion.
One of the ways that we create particular memories for
ourselves, and how we create our own particular sets of
experiences that make up our lives, is through the process of
story creation and storytelling. However, given the fact that
the story that I tell about an event could be vastly different
from the story that someone else tells about the same event,
the reality of the situation is that we often choose to tell what
we want to tell and thereby manipulate our own experience
into the way we want to experience it. Often, we tell stories to
certain people, in certain ways, in order to give them a certain
sense of the way we wish them to perceive us.[30] What we
keep in memory is the gist or the skeleton of a story and then
we can tell it in different ways depending on what we are
hoping the effect of the story to be on the hearer of the story.
What may change the stories and the memories even more
than the different ways we experience situations is the post-
story creation. For example, if I feel like I have had a particular
kind of injustice done to me recently, I begin to see these
kinds of injustices done to others more often than I have seen
them before, and I then, in turn, talk about the prevalence of
these injustices around me as well. Thus I am aware of it, so I
tend to see it more, so I talk about it more, so it becomes
more ingrained in my memory. Years later I can recall the time
when I was so focused on that injustice. Someone else may
not be looking for my injustice and so will not be telling stories
about it or creating memories around it.
The kinds of stories we tell are also connected to the way we
choose to see the world. Thus in much therapy, especially
psychoanalytic therapy, the goal is not just storytelling, but
storytelling that can be modified into healthier or more positive
or productive life stories. Therapy that just allows one to
rehearse negative stories would likely do more harm than
good. When we tell people stories about our experiences, in
the process of creating and telling the story the memory
structure will be created at the same time. Story creation is a
memory creating experience in itself. This memory structure
produced the first time the story is told will contain the gist of
the story that we remember long-term. Talking is memory
creation and if one has an experience that she never once talks
about, it is likely that she will not create any kind of long
lasting memory of the experience.[31] Rehearsal also helps
memory; the more often a story is told the more prevalent it
will be in memory.
The fact of the matter is that story invention is a process of
massaging reality. All we have are the perspectives and stories
that we tell, constructed through the lenses of the other
experiences we have had and the beliefs and attitudes that we
have about the world.[32] The truth conditions that apply to
propositional statements are not helpful in describing human
experience in this way. Unfortunately (for some), Schank
explains, "our stories, because they are shaped by memory
processes that do not always have their basis in hard fact, are
all fictions."[33] This is not to say that these fictions did not
happen or are not based on anything at all, but as far as they
are constructed through the medium of narrative they are
necessarily perspectival. It is this shared aspect of narration
that literary fiction shares with the fictions or stories of our
everyday lives. Even though the fictions or stories we create
are based on lived experience and sometimes even on concrete
events, the stories are still created through perspectives that
do not allow "true reality," or the "truth" of what really
happened, to come out. What really happened, aside from the
way those who were there experienced it, does not
meaningfully exist for us outside of our own standpoint.
Epistemologically, we have no unbiased access to the events of
our lives.
5. Narrative selves
A narrative based theory of personal identity[34] helps to lay
the groundwork for this more integrated notion of
understanding narrative. Psychologists have given us the
framework in which to tell stories in order to recreate and
reinvent ourselves through talk therapy. Freud, moreover,
suggested that we are like a host of characters in a play in and
of ourselves, which we produce ourselves, internally.[35]
These aspects of our personalities should not, ideally, take over
one another or violently wage war with one another, as
happens when mental instability and illness arrive. The goal of
psychoanalytic therapy is to help the analysand to recall and
reinvent the stories that make up the self, which is a
malleable, story-based, personal identity. Stories are the
connectors in memory and are perhaps the linchpin to a
coherent narrative based theory of personal identity.
In his ethical treatise, After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre develops
a narrative concept of selfhood. He notes that experience does
not come to us in the form of narrative, but rather we
construct narrative in order to make sense of experience. The
way we experience the world is easily understood through the
construction of narrative; it is where we feel most at home,
living our lives, telling our narratives to others and importantly,
understanding others' actions in terms of narrative. MacIntyre
explains "stories are lived before they are told - except in the
case of [literary] fiction."[36] Only in literary fictions do we see
the narrative framework of an event already pre-packaged.
Because our own senses of selves are located in these
narrative constructions we relate to them very naturally.
The events that comprise our personal histories are linked
together by narrative and our ability to share these histories
with others is expressed through narrative as well. These
histories linked together eventually become part of our own
sense of self. We are the stories we tell. There is no such thing
as a static, intuitively obvious, or essential singular self to be
identified or pointed to. Humans are not, by nature, such fixed
entities. I will never find my real self, if I strip away the roles
that I play in my life or produce a list of beliefs that I hold. I
am these roles and these beliefs and these come out in my
interactions with others and through the stories that I tell. The
sense of self is that which gets talked about and reflected
through the stories we tell. We invent and reinvent our selves
in order to meet the needs of every situation we encounter.
Part of what keeps the identity stable at all are the beliefs and
attitudes that stay with us at the core, and part of what keeps
the identity stable is the storehouse of memories and stories
we choose to tell ourselves and others. To tell about oneself is
like making up a story about where one has been, what one
has learned and why one is doing what one does.
In his work on narrative selves, Owen Flanagan argues for
what he calls the self model, in which the self is "both a real
entity and an abstract idea intended to pick out the most
important features of an individual's life."[37] He argues that
there is an essential self to which we have no reliable access.
He compares the core of the self to an event in history that
did, indeed, happen and should not be construed as a fiction.
Historians pillage through the collected versions of the stories
that recount an event in hopes of finding the one that
approximates the real event most accurately. Flanagan
explains that an "omniscient historian"[38] might be able to
represent an event as it really happened, but in reality there
are no omniscient historians, as there are no omniscient
narrators of our own selves. Flanagan seems to confuse the
ontological self and the epistemological self, however, not
taking into consideration that we can only have knowledge of
our selves epistemically and not ontologically-thus even an
omniscient narrator would only be giving us epistemological
insight. Whether or not there is a core ontological self is
irrelevant to the discussion of the suggestion that our selves
are created through narrative.
Jerome Bruner argues that without the capacity to make and
tell stories about ourselves, there would be no sense of
personal identity at all.[39] He evidences a neurological
disorder called 'dysnarrativia,' which is "a severe impairment in
the ability to tell or understand stories" that is related to the
other neurological disorders such as Korsakov's syndrome[40]
and Alzheimer's disease. One of the characteristic symptoms of
dysnarrativia is an almost total loss of the ability to understand
others' behavior and how others might experience various
events emotionally. Sufferers of dysnarrativia have an
imagination that is compromised by their inability to tell
stories. No only do sufferers of dysnarrativia experience a loss
of self, but also they lose their sense of empathy and all of
their sense of the human experience of others. A medical study
by Kay Young and Jeffrey Saver on various forms of
dysnarrativia claims that selfhood is directly related to the
ability to construct narratives.[41] The construction of self is
inherently incomplete without a capacity to narrate. The ability
to tell stories is not just about communication with others; it is
about creating a coherent script, life story, or integrated matrix
within which to make sense of one's life. The ability to narrate
seems to be then a necessary condition for personal identity,
although it is not sufficient.
Richard Wollheim suggests another way of characterizing the
mental states that help to describe imagining generally (and in
our narrative imaginings) that could help to differentiate two
different kinds of imaginings that underlie our ability to
understand narrative. He suggests that we have iconic mental
states [IMS], which are descriptive of a particular kind of
imagining, specifically a visual imagining. IMS may be about
individual people, but are more often imaginings of events that
have their own characters. IMS regularly occur in sequences in
themselves, the mental states follow one another sequentially,
and the characters who act in the events are what Wollheim
refers to as the dramatis personae. IMS have a central
imaginer[42] for whom the events of a story unfold into a
narrative. The second feature of IMS Wollheim points out is
that the individuals, events, sequences of events, and stories
that iconic mental states are of, represent, iconically, the
individuals and events themselves, whether real or imagined.
Wollheim recognizes the difficulty in characterizing how exactly
this kind of representation works, but suggests that the kind of
representational relationship he is referring to is the
relationship between the intentionality and the subjectivity of
the IMS. He argues that we do not necessarily have to
"observe our images before we can know what they are, any
more than we have to listen to the words we think in before we
can know what they are."[43] This is a large part of how iconic
imagining is of a different kind than non-iconic or propositional
imagining. Perhaps these iconic imaginings are more reflective
of, or iconographic, rather than strictly representational of, a
one to one relationship: the iconic imaginings are intentionally
related either way. Thirdly, and perhaps most important,
Wollheim argues that "Iconic mental states have causal efficacy
over the behavior and the mental dispositions of the person
who has them."[44] IMS have psychic force. Iconic imaginings
are different from lightly entertained or even deeply held
propositional beliefs because they are not propositional at all.
Wollheim gives an example of an iconic report as follows: "I
imagined the horse's falling down in the street." Conversely, a
non-iconic report would be: "I imagined that the horse fell
down in the street." While the first (iconic) report is something
that can be understood only in terms of a visual imagining, the
second report is a propositional statement that can be
understood discursively, and in terms of belief requirements. It
is clear that these are two fundamentally different kinds of
reports and that one is not reducible to the other, nor would
one be an effective means of understanding or utilizing the
other. Recognizing that there are two ways of representing the
report leads to an importantly different way of characterizing
our reports about what we believe or disbelieve, imagine, or
report about our experiences in the "real" world as well as with
our encounters with fiction. Beliefs are not necessary for
emotional responses, but IMS are.
Iconic imagining might help to explain the significant drop in
beach attendance the summer after the film Jaws was
released. Entertaining or believing the proposition (non-iconic)
"I imagine that there are sharks in the ocean" is very different
from (iconic) "I imagine there being sharks in the ocean." The
latter might command psychic force in a way that the former
would not, still not requiring even an entertained belief. I
borrow the Jaws example from Kendall Walton but with a
different intended purpose. Walton explains that "Jaws caused
a lot of people to fear sharks, ones they thought might really
exist, and to avoid swimming in the ocean. But this does not
mean that they were afraid of the fictional sharks in the
movie."[45] He goes on to argue that the fear experienced by
those watching the sharks generates a fear of the depiction of
the sharks and not of the sharks depicted. What I want to
argue is not that the fear is caused solely by the depiction of
the sharks or by the mere thought of the sharks. Rather, the
depiction prompts the IMS, which accounts for a kind of
imagining that elicits an emotion that commands psychic force.
Iconic imagining by itself cannot account for resulting emotions
but IMS can be a part of what accounts for the motivation that
leads one to form real beliefs and desires that become part of
the cognitive makeup of the emotive response. Iconic
imagining can thus account for a number of different kinds of
emotional responses to fictional intentional objects that
continue to be problematic for other kinds of theories.
Narrative descriptions that prompt iconic imaginings can
produce affective, emotional responses that do not seem to be
so philosophically inconsistent with apparent belief sets.
IMS help us to recognize, along with the narrative mode of
understanding, that the discursive mode is not the only way
that we can imagine, remember or entertain thoughts. Given
the IMS option, it might be possible to begin to leave behind
the belief requirement once thought necessary for a justified
emotive response to anything, real or fictional. It is not even
that we cannot have justified emotive responses without the
belief in their reality, but rather it now appears to be the case
that it is a category mistake to discuss a belief requirement at
all. Belief and disbelief, in conjunction with the necessity of
truth and falsity of propositional statements, can only work in a
non-iconic, discursive framework. If narrative understanding is
taken to be a viable option to the discursive, the narrative
ordering of experience, along with IMS, can take the place of
the once firmly held need for belief in the propositions that
describe a fiction that were once thought necessary for justified
emotive responses.
6. Conclusions
I want to return to the suggestion that I made earlier that
fiction and reality are not as distinguishable as we might like to
think. This is not to say that I cannot distinguish, or that I even
have trouble distinguishing, between my life and Anna
Karenina's life or my friend's life and Anna's life. What I am
suggesting is that the way that my life, and personal identity
broadly construed, is constructed is through narrative
understanding, and not through discursive understanding.
Fiction and reality are distinct ontologically and epistemically
but they are both understood by means of the same cognitive
process. My personal identity or my sense of self is created and
understood in the same way that I order, understand, and
make sense of Anna Karenina's life story. Conveniently, hers is
already carefully crafted and pre-packaged for me so that
when I read about her predicament I am provided with all of
the relevant information that I need for narrative
understanding. Thus the huge advantage of reading literature
is that much of the filtering of unnecessary detail is left out and
what is left is the narrative description that will (ideally) lend
itself well to the narrative understanding. If only our lives and
the lives of our friends arrived so concisely and orderly!
In conclusion, it should now be clear how the narrative mode
can enhance the explanation of the way we order our
experience of the world. I further think that on my view,
utilizing the narrative mode of understanding in addition to the
recognition of the way we utilize IMS, we can move beyond the
paradox of fiction and begin to explain our emotional responses
to fiction in these terms. Without the constraints of the
paradox itself, the centrality of the belief component within the
paradox, and the recognition that modes of understanding are
more important than the acknowledgment of the fictionality or
non-fictionality of a given story, our emotional responses to
fiction seem less philosophically inconsistent. Introducing the
notion of narrative understanding, the pitfalls of the paradox of
fiction can be avoided from the start. We do not need to
assume the truth of all three propositions because we do not
need to begin exclusively from the assumption that the
cognitive theory of emotions is the only way to produce
genuine emotive responses. With narrative understanding
provided as an additional way to account for narrative
experience and narrative meaning construction, there comes
an alternative with which to deal with the paradox differently.
Narrative understanding will also enable the philosophical
discussion concerning our emotive responses to fiction to
resume in a way that is more consistent with our actual
experience.
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